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Lucas: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A CUMULATIVE APPROACH TO
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE:
NEW YORK’S REQUIREMENT THAT COUNSEL’S
CUMULATIVE EFFORTS AMOUNT TO MEANINGFUL
REPRESENTATION
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Bodden1
(decided March 1, 2011)
This case concerns a conviction that was overturned based on
the appellant‘s receiving representation that amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel. While the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel has been well established, and its parameters substantially
defined, this case broadened the general scope. The court did not
find any particular action by defense counsel to have amounted to ineffective assistance, but instead, by evaluating counsel‘s performance
throughout the duration of the trial, the court held that the overall performance was so lacking that the cumulative effect of counsel‘s conduct amounted to a violation of a criminal defendant‘s constitutional
right to meaningful representation.
I.

ANALYSIS OF THIS CASE

The appellant, Richard Bodden, appealed his conviction on
two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree,
criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and harassment in the second degree. 2 He
1
2

918 N.Y.S.2d 141 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2011).
Id. at 142.
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also separately filed a motion pursuant to CPL § 440.103 in the trial
court ―to vacate the judgment on the ground of ineffective assistance
of counsel.‖4 When the trial court denied that motion, appellant appealed the denial, and the Appellate Division, Second Department
consolidated the two appeals in this case.5 The court reversed the
judgment as a matter of law, finding that the cumulative effect of defense counsel‘s conduct throughout the trial amounted to a violation
of appellant‘s constitutional right to meaningful representation.6
The representation provided to the appellant was so lacking
that the trial court, prior to sentencing, stated ―on the record that it
was troubled by the defense counsel‘s performance during the trial.‖7
Among the list of deplorable acts noted by the court were defense
counsel‘s statements during jury selection–in front of prospective
jury members–in which he distanced himself from his client, his failure to cross-examine an eyewitness in order to exploit weaknesses in
direct testimony, and his use of an offensive term to describe the race
of a person allegedly present at the time appellant was arrested.8
When the court invited defense counsel to inspect photographs
sought to be introduced by the prosecution, defense counsel declined,
even though he ―acknowledge[ed] that he had not seen them before.‖9
Defense counsel also ―offered to stipulate that a witness was ‗an expert on whatever you want him to testify to,‘ even though the witness
was a fact witness.‖10 He also ―offered to stipulate to [the] entire testimony [of another prosecution witness,] even though counsel acknowledged that he had ‗no idea what the witness was going to testify to.‘ ‖11
Defense counsel‘s closing statements primarily focused ―on
the role of the jury in a democracy‖ with only ―cursory observations
3
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(h) (McKinney 2010) (allowing judgment made in
violation of defendant‘s state or federal constitutional rights to be vacated in favor of a new
trial).
4
Bodden, 918 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 142-43 (―Under these circumstances, the defendant was deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel and, therefore, is entitled to a new trial‖).
7
Id. at 142.
8
Id. at 143.
9
Bodden, 918 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
10
Id.
11
Id.
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about the [prosecution‘s] evidence;‖ there were serious weaknesses in
that evidence which he failed to bring to the jury‘s attention.12 Also,
during the prosecution‘s closing statements, defense counsel did not
object to comments implying ―the defendant‘s character increased the
likelihood that he committed the charged crimes.‖13 The court found
that the cumulative effect of these actions resulted in appellant‘s deprivation of effective assistance of counsel, and entitled him to a new
trial.14
In its reasoning, the court noted that under the New York
standard, which it called ―somewhat more favorable to defendants‖15
than the federal standard, the constitutional requirements ―are met
when the defense attorney provides meaningful representation.‖16
The focus is on the ―fairness of the process as a whole rather than its
particular impact on the outcome of the case.‖17 In applying the New
York rule, the court did not single out any particular act or error
committed by counsel as an error that amounts to ineffective assistance, but rather found that the cumulative effect of the frequent and
obvious failings of counsel deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance of counsel.18 Counsel‘s representation as a whole
did not amount to the ―meaningful representation‖ that the defendant
was entitled to, and rendered the judicial process unfair.19
II.

THE FEDERAL STANDARD

In ruling that Richard Bodden had not received meaningful
representation, the court upheld his right to effective assistance of
counsel, a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.20 In interpreting this constitutional provi12

Id.
Id.
14
Bodden, 918 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
15
Id. at 142 (quoting People v. Turner, 840 N.E.2d 123, 126 (N.Y. 2005)).
16
Id. (quoting People v. Stultz, 810 N.E.2d 883, 884 (N.Y. 2004)).
17
Id. at 143 (quoting People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 588 (N.Y. 1998)).
18
Id.
19
Bodden, 918 N.Y.S.2d 142-43. While the New York standard does not require a showing of prejudice, and the court did not identify whether it found counsel‘s actions to be prejudicial, it can hardly be argued, after all of counsel‘s errors and failures, that the jury would
not have been prejudiced by his performance. Id. at 143.
20
The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent part: ―In all criminal prosecutions, the ac13
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sion, the Supreme Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright21 that it not
only mandates provision of counsel to defendants in federal criminal
trials, but also obligates the states to provide counsel to defendants in
criminal trials in state courts.22 The Court further required in Strickland v. Washington23 that the assistance provided by counsel to the
defendant must be ―reasonably effective.‖24 ―The benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel‘s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.‖25
In determining whether counsel‘s representation was ineffective, the Court in Strickland established a two-part test.26 The defendant must prove that counsel‘s performance was deficient, which ―requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the ‗counsel‘ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment.‖27 The defendant must also show that the deficient performance of counsel prejudiced the defense, which ―requires
showing that counsel‘s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.‖28
In evaluating whether counsel‘s performance was actually deficient, the court must examine the facts of that particular case and
counsel‘s chosen course of conduct, viewed as of the time of the conduct–without the added clarity of hindsight–and determine whether it
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.29 The court‘s ―scrutiny of counsel‘s performance
must be highly deferential,‖ thus indulging ―a strong presumption
that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.‖30 To prove that the deficiency of counsel‘s performance prejudiced the defense, ―[t]he defendant must show that
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.‖ U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
21
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22
Id. at 344.
23
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
24
Id. at 687.
25
Id. at 686.
26
Id. at 687.
27
Id.
28
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
29
Id. at 689.
30
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/34

4

Lucas: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

2012]

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

1077

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‖31 In
determining whether counsel‘s performance resulted in the required
prejudice, the court must consider the totality of the evidence before
the judge or jury, and ―ask if the defendant has met the burden of
showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been
different absent the errors.‖32 The defendant must prove that counsel‘s performance was both deficient and that it prejudiced the defense; failure to prove either part results in dismissal of the claim.33
A.

Types of Errors That Constitute Ineffective
Assistance

In Henry v. Poole,34 the Second Circuit held that a single error
made by defense counsel can amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel.35 When counsel advances a false alibi–an alibi for a period
of time after the crime, but not covering the actual time of the crime–
and relies on that false alibi throughout the trial, and in summation
acknowledges that the alibi is not for the actual time of the crime, that
error amounts to a reasonable probability that counsel‘s conduct was
deficient, especially if counsel had reason to know, prior to the start
of the trial, that the alibi was false.36 Similarly, when such false alibi
is so relied on, and its falsity is so clearly obvious to the jury, it is
reasonable to conclude that the outcome of the trial would be preju-

31

Id. at 694.
Id. at 696.
33
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. In applying the new standard to the facts of the case before
it, the Court held that counsel‘s strategic choice to rely as fully as possible on his client‘s
statements during pleading, and not investigating or introducing further character or psychological evidence, was reasonable, because it precluded the prosecution from countering any
such evidence with more damning evidence of the client‘s criminal record. Id. at 698-701.
Thus, failing to investigate or introduce evidence that could be of benefit to the client is not
necessarily proof of deficient performance if counsel reasonably believed that not introducing such evidence, and so precluding the prosecution from introducing counter-evidence that
is more detrimental, would serve the client better than the benefit of having the evidence introduced. See id. Based on this determination, the Court held that counsel‘s representation
was not deficient, and so the client failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance. Id.
34
409 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2005).
35
See id. at 64.
36
Id. at 64-65.
32

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [2012], Art. 34

1078

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

diced by counsel‘s advancement of the false alibi.37 As such, the
court held that counsel‘s representation fell below the standard for effective assistance.38
In Cox v. Donnelly,39 the Second Circuit held that counsel‘s
failure to object to a court‘s unconstitutional jury instruction on the
intent component of the charge of murder can amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel.40 In doing so, the court emphasized the significance of whether the intent component was a central issue on which
the conviction depended.41 In a prior case, Tsirizotakis v. LeFevre,42
the Second Circuit held that failure to object to a constitutionally defective intent instruction can be strategic, in that counsel might not
want to make an issue of intent, as it would detract from the primary
defense of justification.43 However, in Cox, where the conviction depended solely on the issue of intent, failing to object to the defective
jury instruction did amount to deficient performance.44 And, given
that the issue of intent was so central to the case, and the fact that the
jury twice asked for clarification on the issue of intent, counsel‘s failure to object to the defective instruction resulted in prejudice that reasonably could have affected the outcome of the case.45
Other failures of counsel that amount to ineffective assistance,
as held in Carrion v. Smith,46 are ―fail[ure] to advise [the client] of
the sentencing exposure he faced if he were convicted at trial,‖ and
―fail[ure] to give [the client] advice regarding the advisability of accepting the plea offer that was sufficiently robust under the circumstances.‖47 When counsel breaches a fundamental duty to the client,
37

Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 67.
39
387 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2004).
40
Id. at 200.
41
Id. at 199 (―[H]ere, intent was not only at issue, it was the sole issue on which [defendant]‘s conviction depended at the time the defective instruction was given. . . . We therefore
cannot accept the state‘s argument that counsel abandoned the issue of [defendant]‘s intent
as a tactical maneuver.‖).
42
736 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1984).
43
Id. at 63.
44
Cox, 387 F.3d at 199-200.
45
Id.
46
644 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
47
Id. at 467 (―When a plea offer is made and there is a reasonable probability that the defendant is uncertain about the sentencing exposure he faces, whether or not he accepts the
plea, a lawyer unquestionably has a duty to inform his client of the sentencing exposure he
38

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/34

6

Lucas: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

2012]

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

1079

such as loyalty, confidentiality, or in this case, the duty to inform the
client of sentencing exposure, counsel‘s assistance falls below the objective level of reasonableness.48
III.

THE NEW YORK STANDARD

In addition to the right to counsel guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, defendants in criminal trials in New York State
courts are also guaranteed the right to counsel by the New York State
Constitution.49 The Court of Appeals stated in People v. Baldi,50
three years before the Supreme Court would rule on this issue, that
―[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by
both the Federal and [New York] State Constitutions. . . .‖ 51 ―[T]he
right ‗means more than just having a person with a law degree nominally represent (defendant) upon a trial and ask questions.‘ ‖52
The Court recognized at that time that the lower courts had
developed two different standards for reviewing effectiveness of
counsel.53 ―The traditional standard has been whether the attorney‘s
shortcomings were such as to render the ‗trial a farce and a mockery
faces if he accepts the plea offer and if he does not.‖).
48
Id. Criminal defendants are also entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the pretrial and appellate phases of their case. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding that the Strickland ―test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.‖); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404, 1410 (2012) (holding that a
criminal defendant‘s right to effective assistance of ―counsel extends to the negotiation and
consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected.‖); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,
1385 (2012) (holding that a criminal defendant, who claims ineffective assistance of counsel
during plea consideration, must show ―that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a
reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court . . . that the
court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the
offer‘s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact
were imposed.‖); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (holding that criminal defendants have a right to effective assistance of appellate counsel on first appeal); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (holding that the proper standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is that enunciated in Strickland).
49
The New York Constitution states, in pertinent part: ―In any trial in any court whatever
the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions. . . .‖ N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
50
429 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1981).
51
Id. at 404.
52
Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 586 (quoting People v. Bennett, 280 N.E.2d 637, 639 (N.Y.
1972)).
53
Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 404.
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of justice.‘ ‖54 The other standard, which the court described as stricter, was whether counsel exhibited ―reasonable competence.‖55 The
court departed from the ―farce or mockery‖ test, and adopted the
―stricter‖ standard–that of ―meaningful representation.‖56 ―Under the
[New York] State Constitution, ‗prejudice‘ is examined more generally in the context of whether defendant received meaningful representation.‖57 Counsel‘s conduct must amount to ―egregious and prejudicial‖ error such that defendant did not receive a fair trial.58
However, the focus of the inquiry is on the fairness of the trial, not on
prejudice—whether counsel‘s representation, be it prejudicial or not,
resulted in the defendant receiving a fair trial.59
In determining whether the standard was met, the court required that ―the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation,
reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation . . . .‖60
Further, in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance, the court must
take care ―to avoid both confusing true ineffectiveness [of counsel]
with mere losing tactics and according undue significance to retrospective analysis.‖61 Instead, ― ‗it is incumbent on defendant to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations‘ for
counsel‘s alleged shortcomings.‖62
The court noted that counsel ―is not required to argue factual
innocence at the expense of a stronger defense,‖ and can reasonably
argue ―his client‘s factual innocence, or his insanity, or both,‖ especially if the factual innocence argument is weak.63 Counsel‘s performance does not amount to ineffective assistance merely for being
―unable . . . to shake [a prosecution witness‘s] criticism of his less
experienced colleagues‘ [conclusions] or to induce him to modify his

54

Id. (quoting People v. Aiken, 380 N.E.2d 272, 274 (N.Y. 1978)).
Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405.
56
Id.
57
Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588.
58
Id. (quoting People v. Flores, 639 N.E.2d 19, 21 (N.Y. 1994)).
59
Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588.
60
Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405.
61
Id.
62
Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587 (quoting People v. Rivera, 525 N.E.2d 698, 700 (N.Y.
1988)).
63
Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405.
55
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own conclusion . . .‖ during a weak cross-examination.64 Counsel‘s
taking the witness stand and giving testimony contradicting his client
does not render his assistance ineffective if the testimony serves ―a
proper purpose[, such as] the establishment of [an] insanity defense.‖65 Nor is it improper for counsel to state in summation that
counsel ―decline[s] to vouch for [the] client‘s credibility,‖ when the
weaknesses in the prosecution‘s case is still argued, and defenses
emphasized.66
Similarly, in People v. Satterfield,67 counsel decided not to introduce evidence to impeach a witness, but instead chose to argue
that the witness‘s statement placing defendant at the crime scene was
a misidentification.68 Impeaching the credibility of that witness‘s account of the events would have worked against the defense, because
counsel attempted to establish that the account was correct, apart
from the misidentification.69 The court held that such decisions fall
within the spectrum of strategic options counsel may pursue, and
does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.70 Counsel‘s
subjective reasons for choosing a certain trial strategy are immaterial
to a determination of whether the assistance provided was effective.71
Rather, when viewed objectively, if the facts and circumstances of
the case reveal the existence of a trial strategy that might be pursued
by a reasonably competent attorney, that is sufficient to dismiss a
claim of ineffective assistance.72
In People v. Benevento,73 the Court of Appeals emphasized
that counsel‘s assistance is not ineffective purely because it does not
result in the client‘s acquittal.74 While the client is entitled to mea64

Id. at 406.
Id.
66
Id. Based on these determinations, the court held that counsel‘s conduct was not unreasonable and did not ―ma[k]e a farce [or] mockery of the trial,‖ and so ―it simply cannot be
said as a matter of law that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.‖ Id. at 407.
67
488 N.E.2d 834 (N.Y. 1985).
68
Id. at 836-37.
69
Id. at 836.
70
Id. at 836-37.
71
Id. at 836.
72
Satterfield, 488 N.E.2d at 836.
73
697 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 1998).
74
Id. at 588. This inference, logical as it is, was at the heart of the defendant‘s claim of
ineffective assistance, and the court went to a great length to clearly state this point. Id.
65
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ningful representation, that representation does not have to be perfect
or errorless.75 Even with perfect representation, a defendant in a
criminal trial can still be convicted. Therefore, counsel‘s assistance
does not have to be perfect, and the outcome of the representation is
not dispositive as to its effectiveness.76 Where counsel set a clear and
reasonable strategy from opening remarks through summation, that
strategy cannot be questioned as ineffective merely because the client
was convicted, even if counsel stated during the opening that the
client will testify and later decides not to call the client to the stand.77
In People v. Turner,78 the Court of Appeals held that a single
failing in an otherwise flawless representation by counsel can be ―so
‗egregious and prejudicial‘ ‖ that it would deprive the client of the
right to effective assistance.79 While errors such as ―overlooking a
useful piece of evidence‖ or ―failing to take maximum advantage of a
Rosario violation‖ would not necessarily in and of itself amount to
the degree of prejudice so as to result in ineffective assistance, there
are other errors that would.80 One such error is failure to raise a defense that is clear-cut and completely dispositive, such as a lapsed
statute of limitations.81 The court held that such a failure, absent a
reasonable explanation, does amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel.82
But the defense must also be viable for it to amount to ineffective assistance if counsel fails to raise it.83 Failure to submit an affirmative defense that, if successful, would have been a complete defense to the crimes charged, does not necessarily amount to
ineffective assistance if counsel had reason to believe the defense
75

Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
77
Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588-89.
78
840 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 2005).
79
Id. at 126 (quoting People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213, 220 (N.Y. 2005)).
80
Turner, 840 N.E.2d at 126. The Rosario rule is an adoption of the federal Jencks rule,
under which defense counsel may examine for itself a witness‘ prior statements which is in
the prosecution‘s possession, regardless of whether it comports with the witness‘ testimony
at trial, so long as those prior statements relates to the subject matter of the witness‘ testimony at trial, and contained no confidential information. People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881,
883 (N.Y. 1961).
81
Turner, 840 N.E.2d at 126.
82
Id.
83
People v. Georgiou, 828 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544-45 (App. Div. 2d. Dep‘t 2007).
76
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would not prevail.84 ―There can be no denial of effective assistance
of . . . counsel arising from counsel‘s failure to ‗make a motion or argument that ha[d] little or no chance of success.‘ ‖85 In People v.
Georgiou86 the Appellate Division, Second Department held that ―the
mere fact that the defendant would have been entitled to submit the
affirmative defense had his counsel requested it, does not, in and of
itself, prove that he was denied effective assistance‖ of counsel.87
The court said that while it was surely an error on the part of counsel
not to submit the affirmative defense to the jury, there was sufficient
evidence to determine that the omission was a harmless error, which
had little to no effect on the outcome of the case, and as such, did not
impact the fairness of the trial.88
IV.

THE STANDARD IN OTHER STATES

The overwhelming majority of states have adopted the Strickland test for evaluating effectiveness of counsel under their state constitutions.89
84

Id.
People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213, 220 (N.Y. 2005) (quoting Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 890).
86
828 N.Y.S.2d 541(App. Div. 2d. Dep‘t 2007).
87
Id. at 545.
88
Id. at 546.
89
JOHN M. BURKOFF & NANCY M. BURKOFF, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL § 2:5
n.3 (2011); Alabama: Ex parte Lawley, 512 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Ala. 1987) (―Under the standards enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, and adopted by this Court in Ex parte Baldwin, a two-pronged test must be met before a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
proven.‖); Arizona: State v. Nash, 694 P.2d 222, 227 (Ariz.1985) (―This Court adopted the
second prong of Strickland in Lee. We now believe it is time to adopt Strickland‘s first
prong as well.‖); Arkansas: Pogue v. State, 872 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Ark. 1994) (―For those
claims of ineffective counsel that we are able to reach, they must be examined in light of the
standard set in Strickland v. Washington.‖); California: People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839,
868 (Cal. 1987) (―In addition to showing that counsel‘s performance was deficient, a criminal defendant must also establish prejudice before he can obtain relief on an ineffectiveassistance claim. The United States Supreme Court expressly enunciated this requirement in
Strickland. And we implied as much in Fosselman.‖); Colorado: People v. Valdez, 789 P.2d
406, 410 (Colo. 1990) (―The two-prong test enunciated in Strickland is designed to preserve
the right to effective assistance of counsel in light of the primary basis for such right—the
assurance that at all critical stages of the adjudicative process a criminal defendant
represented by counsel is in fact represented by an attorney of sufficient quality to ensure
that the process itself is fundamentally fair.‖); Connecticut: Quintana v. Warden, State Prison, 593 A.2d 964, 965 (Conn. 1991) (―The . . . court concluded that the appropriate standard
for examining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in Strickland v. Washington. . . .‖); Delaware: Smith v. State, 991 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Del. 2010) (―Ineffective assis85
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tance of counsel claims are reviewed pursuant to the two-pronged standard established by
the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.‖); Florida: Stephens v. State,
748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999) (―The determination of ineffectiveness pursuant to Strickland is a two-pronged analysis: (1) whether counsel‘s performance was deficient; and (2)
whether the defendant was prejudiced thereby.‖); Georgia: Turpin v. Christenson, 497
S.E.2d 216, 222 (Ga. 1998) (―The Supreme Court of Georgia adopted the Strickland test in
Smith v. Francis.‖); Idaho: Estrada v. State, 149 P.3d 833, 838 (Idaho 2006) (―The United
States Supreme Court established the standard for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington.‖); Illinois: People v. Albanese, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1255 (Ill.
1984) (―Although we do not foresee that application of the Strickland rule will produce results that vary significantly from those reached under Greer, we hereby adopt the Supreme
Court rule for challenges to effectiveness of both retained and appointed counsel. . . .‖); Indiana: Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ind. 2002) (―Under Strickland v. Washington, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that: (1) counsel‘s performance was deficient by falling below an objective standard of reasonableness based on
prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel‘s performance prejudiced the defendant so
much that ‗there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.‘ ‖ (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694));
Iowa: State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Iowa 2004) (―Failure to prove either prong of
the Strickland test results in failure of the defendant‘s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim.‖); Kansas: Chamberlain v. State, 694 P.2d 468, 475 (Kan. 1985) (―While the actual
application of the standards from Schoonover as opposed to those of [Strickland] would in
all probability effect the same result in any given case, we deem it appropriate to now adopt
the [Strickland] holdings as the prevailing yardstick to be used in measuring the effectiveness of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.‖); Kentucky: See Norton v. Com., 63 S.W.3d
175, 177 (Ky. 2001) (―Thus, it appears that the . . . [court in Robbins] attempt[ed] to rephrase
the Strickland standard, not to revise it. Nonetheless, we are compelled to overrule Robbins
to the extent that it conflicts with Strickland, albeit inadvertently.‖); Louisiana: State v.
Lentz, 844 So. 2d 837, 840 n.2 (La. 2003) (―Under the standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel set out in Strickland and adopted by this court in State v. Washington, a reviewing
court must reverse a conviction if the defendant establishes that counsel‘s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and
counsel‘s inadequate performance prejudiced defendant to the extent that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect.‖); Maine: Brewer v. Hagemann, 771 A.2d 1030, 1033
(Me. 2001) (―We apply the Strickland standard in ineffective assistance of counsel cases.‖);
Maryland: State v. Colvin, 548 A.2d 506, 517 (Md. 1988) (―The standards established in
Strickland apply to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under art. 21 [of the Maryland
Constitution].‖); Michigan: People v. Toma, 613 N.W.2d 694, 710 (Mich. 2000) (―The
Michigan Supreme Court in Pickens adopted the Strickland version of what constitutes error
requiring reversal from ineffective assistance of counsel.‖); Minnesota: State v. Rhodes, 657
N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003) (―We analyze ineffective assistance of counsel claims under
a two-prong test set forth in Strickland.‖); Mississippi: Stringer v. State, 627 So. 2d 326, 332
(Miss. 1993) (―This Court has adopted the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland.‖); Missouri: See Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Mo. 2002)
(―To the extent that the cases relied on by the State and other Missouri cases apply a different standard, they are inconsistent with Strickland and should no longer be followed.‖);
Montana: State v. Henderson, 93 P.3d 1231, 1233 (Mont. 2004) (―We have adopted the twopart Strickland test for measuring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.‖); Nebraska:
State v. Miner, 733 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Neb. 2007) (―With regard to the questions of counsel‘s performance or prejudice to the defendant as part of the two-pronged test articulated in
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Strickland v. Washington, an appellate court reviews such legal determinations independently of the lower court‘s decision.‖); Nevada: Means v. State, 103 P.3d 25, 31-32 (Nev. 2004)
(―[W]e evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the test established in
Strickland v. Washington.‖); New Hampshire: State v. Faragi, 498 A.2d 723, 726 (N.H.
1985) (―More recently, however, we have followed the standard set out in Strickland v.
Washington. . . .‖); New Jersey: State v. DiFrisco, 645 A.2d 734, 783 (N.J. 1994) (―This
Court has adopted the Strickland standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel
under the right to counsel provided in the New Jersey Constitution.‖); New Mexico: State v.
Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004) (―The two-part standard delineated in Strickland v.
Washington, applies to ineffective-assistance claims. . . .‖); North Carolina: State v. Braswell, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (N.C. 1985) (―Therefore, we expressly adopt the test set out in
Strickland v. Washington as a uniform standard to be applied to measure ineffective assistance of counsel under the North Carolina Constitution.‖); North Dakota: Flanagan v. State,
712 N.W.2d 602, 607 (N.D. 2006) (―In Woehlhoff v. State, this Court said we use the same
Strickland test to assess ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the state constitution.‖); Ohio: see State v. Bradley, 538 N.E.2d 373, 379 (Ohio 1989) (―This standard is essentially the same as the one enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington.‖); Oklahoma: Gilson v. State, 8 P.3d 883, 926 n.9 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000)
(―Therefore, pursuant to Williams, our analysis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
is based solely upon the two prong test set forth in Strickland. . . .‖); Pennsylvania: Com. v.
Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 976 (Pa. 1987) (―The obvious identical textual and policy considerations in Maroney and Strickland logically lead us to hold that together they constitute the
same rule. Our decisions in Maroney and its progeny, therefore, do not create greater or
lesser protection under Article I, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, than the
present federal standard.‖); Rhode Island: Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I. 2001)
(―This Strickland Test, as adopted in Barboza v. State, provides certain criteria that a complaining applicant must establish in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel.‖); South
Carolina: Caprood v. State, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (S.C. 2000) (―Strickland set forth a twoprong test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel, adopted by this Court in Cherry.‖); South Dakota: Ice v. Weber, 638 N.W.2d 557, 561 (S.D. 2002) ( ―In reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, this Court has adopted the two-part test set forth in
Strickland v. Washington.‖); Tennessee: Dean v. State, 59 S.W.3d 663, 667 (Tenn. 2001)
(―A constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the familiar
standards of Baxter v. Rose, and Strickland v. Washington.‖); Texas: Hernandez v. State, 726
S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (―In short, our constitutional and statutory provisions do not create a standard in ineffective assistance cases that is more protective of a defendant‘s rights than the standard put forward by the Supreme Court in Strickland. Accordingly, we will follow in full the Strickland standards in determining effective assistance and
prejudice resulting therefrom.‖); Utah: Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993)
(―To prevail, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must meet both parts of
the Strickland test.‖); Vermont: State v. Lemire, 640 A.2d 541, 542 (Vt. 1994) (―The Strickland standard applies to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.‖); Virginia:
Yarbrough v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 609 S.E.2d 30, 37 (Va. 2005) (―To prevail on
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must . . . satisfy both parts of the
two-part test established in Strickland.‖); Washington: State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015,
1018 (Wash. 2011) (―[T]he defendant must satisfy the familiar two-part Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance claims. . . .‖); West Virginia: State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d
114, 126 (W. Va. 1995) (―We now make it explicit, in the West Virginia courts, claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are to be governed by the two-pronged test established in
Strickland.‖); Wisconsin: State v. Sanchez, 548 N.W.2d 69, 76 (Wis. 1996) (―[W]e conclude
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New York, however, is not alone in having a different standard. For example, Alaska has its own standard, articulated in Risher
v State.90 This standard basically mirrors the Strickland standard, but
does not require a showing of a ―reasonable probability‖ that counsel‘s error(s) affected the outcome of the case, which requires a higher standard of representation than the prejudice prong in Strickland.91
―Risher requires only that the accused create a reasonable doubt that
counsel‘s incompetence contributed to the conviction, [whereas]
Strickland requires that a ‗reasonable probability‘ of a different outcome be established.‖92 Similarly, Oregon only requires that ―counsel‘s failure [have] a tendency to affect the result of his trial,‖ which
is easier to meet than Strickland‘s requirement that defendant show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s prejudicial ineffectiveness, defendant would not have lost at trial.93 Hawaii also uses its
own standard which requires ―(1) that there were specific errors or
omissions reflecting counsel‘s lack of skill, judgment, or diligence;
and (2) that such errors or omissions resulted in either the withdrawal
or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense.‖94
The Hawaii Supreme Court has upheld this standard, in preference to
Strickland, because its view is that it better protects defendants‘
―right to effective assistance of counsel‖ under the Hawaii Constitution.95 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court requires a ―showing that better work might have accomplished something material for
the defense,‖96 and that ―[r]ather than merely unreasonable, we require that challenged tactical judgments must be ‗manifestly unreasonable.‘ ‖97
that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland . . . should also be
the test for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under our state constitution.‖); Wyoming: Asch v. State, 62 P.3d 945, 950 (Wyo. 2003) (―Under the two-prong standard articulated
in Strickland . . . an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on
the record that counsel‘s performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted.‖).
90
523 P.2d 421, 425 (Alaska 1974).
91
Benefield v. State, No. A-5832, 1996 WL 671359, at *2 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 20,
1996).
92
State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 558, 572 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
93
Lichau v. Baldwin, 39 P.3d 851, 857 (Or. 2002); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
94
State v. Aplaca, 837 P.2d 1298, 1305 (Haw. 1992).
95
Id. at 1305 n.2.
96
Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 364 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (Mass. 1977).
97
Commonwealth v. White, 565 N.E.2d 1185, 1190 (Mass. 1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. Adams, 375 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Mass. 1978)).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/34

14

Lucas: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

2012]
V.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

1087

COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL AND NEW YORK
STANDARDS, AND POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS

In comparing the federal and New York State approaches to
this issue, it is noteworthy that the New York approach, first articulated in Baldi, predates the federal approach adopted in Strickland,
and that New York has retained Baldi in preference to the federal
standard.98 The prejudice prong articulated in Strickland is what separates the federal and New York State approaches.99 The Baldi test
is not indifferent as to whether the client was prejudiced by counsel‘s
ineffectiveness, but the client need not fully satisfy the prejudice
prong of the Strickland test in order to prevail.100 New York courts
still regard the client‘s showing of prejudice as significant, but it is
not an indispensable element in determining whether the representation was meaningful.101 The focus, instead, is on the fairness of the
proceedings as a whole, and not just on whether the ineffectiveness of
counsel‘s representation prejudiced the outcome.102 Thus, the Baldi
test is more favorable to defendants in that it makes it easier to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance.103
The Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants with the
right to counsel to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.104
This was the established rule in federal courts, and, in Gideon, the
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment placed the same
obligation on the states.105 Prior to Strickland, states could claim ad98

Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 886.
Id. at 887.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Turner, 840 N.E.2d at 125-26.
104
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339-40.
The Sixth Amendment provides, ‗In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.‘ We have construed this to mean that in federal courts counsel
must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right
is competently and intelligently waived.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 459 (1938)).
105
Id. at 343.
[T]he Court reemphasized what it had said about the fundamental nature
of the right to counsel in this language: ‗We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal
99
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herence to the rule simply by requiring that ―a warm body with a law
degree‖ be placed next to the defendant.106 In Strickland, the Court
could have articulated a rule that would have required states to provide actual meaningful representation, as the ends of justice demand.
However, in its attempt not to limit the potential options of attorneys
to defend their clients, the Court adopted a standard that is so high
that the only instances where attorneys‘ conduct have been found to
be ineffective are such an affront to justice that no reasonable person
could argue against it.
By creating such a high standard, and the resulting burden for
defendants to overcome, the Court allows for such a low quality of
representation to be deemed acceptable that defendants might very
well be deprived of their rights. It certainly is a very complicated
balance between giving attorneys latitude to attempt whatever strategy they believe best serves their clients, and protecting the rights of
the clients from poor representation by their attorneys. But at what
point does giving attorneys so much latitude in their strategy–to the
point where they can just do the bare minimum necessary to meet the
standard–become an affront to justice, and an insult to our legal system?
The government, both federal and state, allocates significant
funding to the prosecution, yet public defenders are chronically underfunded and understaffed.107 It is certainly not popular politically
to increase funding to attorneys defending the indigent, and often,
when budgets are cut, that funding is the first to be reduced.108 The
result being that the right to a defense attorney to assist a defendant at
trial, at least for the indigent, has become the right to have an overworked and underpaid attorney who often does not have the time or
the resources to best represent the client. Justice has become a luxury, something only the rich can afford.

action, were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of
law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution.‘
Id. (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936)).
106
Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 586 (quoting Bennett, 280 N.E.2d at 639); Richard Klein,
The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1446
(1999).
107
See Klein, supra note 106, at 1442-43.
108
Id.
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The New York rule, being somewhat more favorable to defendants, makes it easier for clients to prove that they were not given
effective assistance, but the standard for what is deemed acceptable is
essentially the same as that of Strickland. While the focus is on the
overall fairness of the trial, and not just the outcome of the case, attorneys‘ actions must still be so egregious that it undermines the fairness of the trial before the courts will step in. Thus, instead of striving to give every citizen the best representation, attorneys are given
free rein to do as they wish, so long as they keep above the bare minimum. This seems to be a very small step away from the ―farce and
mockery of justice‖ test that the Court of Appeals abandoned in Baldi.
Of the other states, forty-five have also adopted Strickland
outright as the standard to evaluate challenges to ineffective assistance of counsel under their state constitutions.109 Also, the five
states that use their own tests, which includes New York, still only
hold attorneys accountable to the same level as Strickland, with the
difference being only in the level of proof that the client needs in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance.110 Thus, in all fifty
states, as well as federal courts, the minimum level of performance
by an attorney that is deemed to be acceptable is the same. The New
York test, with its requirement that the representation be ―meaningful,‖ comes closest to being a higher standard, but with the interpretation of ―meaningful‖ being, in practice, essentially the same as Strickland‘s standard of ―objective reasonableness,‖ it, too, falls short.
In an ideal situation, with a truly adversarial system, both
sides would be equal. The attorneys would be of equal skill, with
equal funding and resources available to both. That, though, is not
the system we have. We require not that criminal defendants receive
a perfect trial, but settle for one which is deemed fair. Fairness is assumed, unless there are obvious errors. And even in such cases, the
error must be so egregious that it either prejudices the jury, or affects
the fairness of the judicial process as a whole, in order for the defendant to be granted relief. With court dockets as overloaded as they
are, it is understandable that the judiciary seeks to limit the number of
cases that have to be retried, but certainly judicial economy cannot be
109
110

See supra text accompanying note 89.
See supra text accompanying note 89.
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more important than protecting the rights and liberties of the citizenry.
It would be easy to argue that more funding would improve
the situation. With more funding, public defenders‘ offices could
hire more attorneys, and allow more time and resources to be spent
on each individual case. But, as in most problems, simply throwing
money at it might help mitigate, but will not solve the issue. The
problem is not only that indigent defendants are often given a lower
standard of representation than what should be acceptable; the bigger
problem is that society does not seem to care that this is happening.
The legal profession is considered to be self-regulating.111
Therefore, even where society at large turns a blind eye, the legal
profession itself should seek to improve the service it provides to the
public. Attorneys are required to provide their client with ―competent representation.‖112 Where exactly ―competent representation‖
falls on the spectrum of ―objectively reasonable‖ and ―meaningful
representation‖ is unclear, but the legal profession can hold itself to a
higher standard than that which is required by the courts. Where attorneys provide their clients with deficient representation, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct are violated even though their conduct
may not have prejudiced their client. Even if the courts do not deem
the level of representation to be ineffective, the bar could still require
its members to improve.113
Increased funding, which, under the current economic climate
seems difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, would not in-and-ofitself result in the desired increase in attorneys‘ level of performance.
Nor would professional requirement of higher performance independently solve the problem. A combined approach would be a good
start. However, given the realities of the present, a more reasonable
solution may yet lie with the courts.

111
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.3 cmt. 1 (―Self-regulation of the legal
profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when
they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.‖).
112
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (―A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.‖).
113
See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise Of The
Constitutional Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625,
681-92 (1986).
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In the past, clients had to prove that there were one or multiple instances during their representation that their attorneys‘ errors
amounted to unreasonably deficient assistance. In Bodden, the court
did not require there to be an individual act or omission that was so
egregious as to amount to ineffective assistance by itself. Instead, the
overall level of representation was so poor, and the errors so frequent,
that the court could not but find that the cumulative effect of the errors was unreasonable. This is a shift away from the requirement that
there be an error or omission that in itself is deemed unreasonable in
order to satisfy the Baldi test, and instead evaluates the overall level
of representation throughout the trial as a whole to determine if it met
the standard. Such a shift could be a step in the right direction. If it
is no longer acceptable for attorneys to do the bare minimum for their
clients so long as they do not commit any particularly atrocious error,
but instead have to maintain an overall performance that is considered reasonable, it is possible that the right to effective representation of counsel, especially for the indigent, could again become meaningful.
Jan Lucas*
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